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Abstract 
Internet passwords are required of us more and more. Personal experience 
and research shows us that it is difficult to create and remember unique passwords 
that meet security requirements. This study tested a unique method of password 
generation based on a selection of mnemonic aids aimed at increasing the 
usability, security and memorability of passwords. Fifty-one engineers, 
accountants and university students aged between 17 – 61 years participated in the 
study. They were randomly assigned to one of three groups: mnemonic, self-
selection and random.  All passwords in the study had to meet the following 
criteria: they had to be unique, at least eight characters long with a mixture of 
letters and numbers, and not include complete words or personal identifiers, 
sequential or repetitive numbers, and the passwords could not be written down or 
recorded anywhere. The mnemonic group created passwords based on a variety of  mnemonic  processes, the self-selection group generated passwords that 
complied with the above criteria, and the random group were assigned random 
passwords generated by the experimenter. Password recall was tested online once 
a week for three weeks, and then the passwords were renewed, with participants 
staying within the same groups for the length of the study. The second password 
was tested weekly for three weeks, then the passwords were renewed for the third 
and final time and tested for a further three weeks. The expectation was that the 
use of mnemonics in password creation would improve accurate recall of 
passwords, more so than if the password was ‘self-selected’ or a random password 
was assigned. The results showed that participants in the mnemonic group were 
able to accurately recall all three passwords significantly more often than 
participants in the self-selection and random groups. Furthermore, passwords 
created by the mnemonic group were more secure than passwords created by the 
self-selection group, as their passwords generated had a greater number of 
characters in them, slightly larger alphabet size, and a higher degree of entropy. 
The results are discussed in terms of the practical relevance of the findings.  
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 General 
“It is a truth universally acknowledged, that…” (Austin, 1813, p.15) it is 
difficult to create unique, secure, passwords that can be accurately recalled at 
some later date. The difficulty lies not only in creating an original password, but 
that passwords are required of users in more and more situations. Research and 
personal experience shows us that it is difficult for users to create and remember a 
password that meets security requirements (Brown, Bracken, Zoccoli, & Douglas, 
2004; Groves, 2002; Horowitz, 2001; Leonhard, 2006; Yan, Blackwell, Anderson, 
& Grant, 2004; Yap, 2001). Requirements such as; using a unique password, 
including at least eight characters with a mixture of letters and numbers, not using 
complete words or personal identifiers, sequential or repetitive numbers, and the 
most common security mistake – not recording the password anywhere.   
 Failure to meet security requirements can be costly. Using the same 
password for different applications makes all accounts vulnerable if at one site the 
password is breached (Gaw & Felten, 2006). Poor password selection, particularly 
using complete words exposes the password to dictionary attacks. Not only is 
poor password selection costly, but forgetting selected passwords can also be 
expensive and time-consuming for businesses. Research shows that forgotten 
passwords account for the highest instance of helpdesk calls, approximately 30 - 
50%, and finance companies admit that it is even higher for them – a staggering 
90% (Groves, 2002). To counteract this lack of security, many organisations force 
users to renew their passwords on a regular basis. This in itself leads to a form of 
rebellion, whereby the user resorts to even more insecure practices, such as 
writing all their passwords down.  
 In order to gain a better understanding of where we stand today with 
password use, effectiveness and inadequacies we firstly need to look at the issues 
surrounding password security, and the characteristics necessary for generating a 
secure password. Secondly, we need to examine password use, looking at the way 
users apply passwords, and the types of passwords chosen. The subsequent 
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sections will describe whether users can remember their passwords or not, and 
solutions for password memorability that have been offered and in some cases 
applied by researchers and practitioners. Finally, we will look further into the area 
of mnemonic aids; assessing cognitive principles that may apply to the area of 
password creation, use and memorability.  
 
1.2 Password Security 
As we move into a society whose core interactions are based on the 
transference of information via online technology, control over who has access to 
that information becomes vitally important. This section addresses the types and 
ways that passwords can be attacked. This is important, as the password is one of 
the first lines of defence. The use of passwords to ensure information security is 
likely to remain for the foreseeable future, for a range of practical reasons (Henry, 
2007). Passwords work with nearly all combinations of existing software, 
hardware, and network systems. It is a fairly easy structure to implement, and 
creates a shared secret between the system and user, that can be accessed 
remotely. If combined with other methods of authentication, it can provide 
multiple layers of defence.  
There are three main forms of password attack, they are: social 
engineering, technical subterfuge, and guessing attacks. Social engineering, as 
Granger (2001) puts it, “is a hacker’s clever manipulation of the natural human 
tendency to trust” with the aim of obtaining access to valued information. This 
can be otherwise known as phishing, a term for ‘password harvesting’. Whereby 
hackers masquerade as a trustworthy person. It is most often done via, email, the 
web, and instant messaging. Social engineering may also take the form of 
‘dumpster diving’ – going through rubbish bins, or by ‘shoulder surfing’ – 
looking over people’s shoulders as they enter their password (Henry, 2007). 
Technical subterfuge covers many forms of attack but they are all a means 
of compromising host security. Henry (2007) provides a list of technical attacks. 
They include, passing-the-hash, rootkits, pharming, packet sniffing, keylogging, 
screenscaping, wiretapping, login spoofing, timing attacks, and identity 
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management system attacks. Henry (2007) goes on to note that no authentication 
mechanism (such as passwords) is safe against these two types of attack. They 
can, to some degree, be addressed by education in the first instance and greater 
technological protection in the second instance.  
However, the main type of attack that applies to this study is the following 
type, guessing attacks. Guessing attacks consist of educated guesses, dictionary 
attacks, brute force guessing, and pre-computing. For pre-computing, crackers 
work out all possible password permutations, which are indexed to lookup tables, 
then all that is needed is just simple comparison with the password. Dictionary 
attacks are carried out in real time and use different dictionary files to crack 
passwords. They can be complimented by permutation of words, slang words, and 
numbers, that is, for each word, permute with 0, 1, 2 and 3 digits to construct 
possible password candidates (Yan, Blackwell, Anderson & Grant 2004). 
Passwords containing complete words can be cracked within seconds (Campbell, 
Kleeman & Ma, 2007). Brute force attacks are similar, in that they are in real 
time, except they try all combinations of all characters, and are only really 
feasible with short passwords (Henry, 2007).  
Understanding these forms of attack, particularly guessing attacks, is the 
first step in developing a method of password creation that makes the password 
less vulnerable. The second step is to, in real terms, define the characteristics of 
what a secure password should consist of. 
 
1.3 Recipe for a Strong Password 
The recipe for a strong password consists of three 
characteristics/ingredients: alphabet size, character length, and entropy – which is 
affected by alphabet size and password length.  
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Alphabet size 
 A password can consist of letters, numbers, and special characters such as 
symbols and punctuation, or numerical codes which stand for characters (ASCII). 
The following are the number of items within each search space (alphabet size). 
• 26 = alphabet (lower case) 
• 36 = alphabet & digits 
• 52 = mixed case letters 
• 68 = letters, digits, symbols & punctuation 
• 94 = keyboard enabled ASCII character set. Which stands for American 
Standard code for Information Interchange. Where the ASCII code is the 
numerical representation of a character  
 
Character length 
Character length is the number of items in a password. Table 1 shows the 
effect of search space (alphabet size) and character length on cracking time. As 
character length (and alphabet size) increases there is an exponential increase in 
cracking time and therefore an increase in security.  
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Table 1.  
The effect of search space on cracking time 
 
Entropy 
Entropy is a measure of disorder or randomness of the sequence of 
characters. As the alphabet size and character length of a password increases so 
does the entropy (as long as it does not contain complete words). “Entropy is a 
direct measure of password strength” (Henry, 2007, p.41). So, if a password has a 
large search space, that is, potentially contains letters, numbers, special characters 
and upper and lower case, as well as good character length (many sites suggest at 
least 8 characters, Yan, 2001), and a high degree of entropy, the password should 
theoretically be very secure/strong.  
As the recipe for a strong password has become known, many 
organisations are beginning to enforce these rules by employing proactive 
password checkers within systems. Proactive password checkers test whether the 
password meets security requirements such as, no names, no words or reversed 
words, does not follow a keyboard pattern or only contain numbers, or is too short 
etc, (Klein, 1990). However, as Yan (2001) points out, they are expensive to 
implement and are unable to be applied to all systems. They are also complex and 
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error prone, take up a lot of space and take time to search (test the password). 
Proactive password checkers should also provide good feedback to the user if the 
password fails the check – which many systems do not.  
The ingredients for a good password have been disclosed, but users do not 
follow the above advice, or many simply do not know what a secure password is, 
or the attacks it may be vulnerable to. The following section addresses this issue, 
looking at how users actually behave. 
 
1.4 User Behaviour 
 Passwords are viewed by most people as a hassle, or as Groves (2002) 
puts it, ‘a time-consuming hindrance’ which inhibits users accessing information 
or sites quickly and easily. In conjunction with this negative attitude towards the 
use of passwords, as mentioned previously, users tend to have little or no 
education about the security issues surrounding password use. Even if they are 
educated, people as a whole tend to take shortcuts, unless they are personally 
motivated to maintain secure practices, or if the system is usable (Weirich & 
Sasse, 2002). User password habits can be broken down into three categories: 
types of passwords chosen, the way those passwords are used, and whether they 
can remember them or not. Statistics available from current literature on the way 
passwords are used is addressed in the next section, followed by the types of 
passwords chosen, and then later we deal with the memorability of passwords.   
1.4.1 Password Use 
SafeNet (2005) showed in their 2004 global password survey that 50 
percent of employees write their passwords down. Sixty-seven percent of people 
have five or more applications that require passwords, and a further 31 percent 
access nine or more applications. Eighty percent of participants use the same 
password for multiple applications, and 47 percent require passwords to be reset 
at least once a year. These findings are similar to those reported by Brown, 
Bracken, Zoccoli and Douglas (2004) in a survey of 218 undergraduate students 
54 percent indicated that they kept a written record of passwords. On average, 
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students had 8 password applications, and used approximately 4.45 different 
passwords to cover those sites.   
The SafeNet (2005) survey also revealed that at least one third of 
respondents shared their passwords with other people. Weirich and Sasse (2002) 
confirmed that many people in organisations succumb to the social pressure of 
disclosing passwords to colleagues in times of need; as it otherwise implies a lack 
of trust. Leyden (2003) also reported that 75 percent of employees know their co-
workers passwords.  
1.4.2 Choice of password. 
One practice is primarily using names and birthdays for constructing 
passwords. Harada and Kuroki (1996) found that 42 percent of people surveyed 
reported using their own names as passwords. Brown, Bracken, Zoccoli and 
Douglas (2004) found over 90 percent of participants in their study used the ‘self’ 
as a basis of password construction. Or, as Leyden (2003) found, 12 percent of 
people used the word ‘password’ as their password. British psychologist, Helen 
Petrie (as reported by Andrews, 2002) stated that password choice could be 
inadvertently revealing, as they are usually chosen on the spot, with whatever 
readily comes to mind. She identified four password genres while analysing the 
responses of 1200 participants in a British survey. Firstly, “family-oriented” 
passwords, which are passwords that either include the person’s name, the name 
of a close family member, pet or a birth date. Secondly, passwords based on 
“fans”, using the name of singers, movie stars, athletes, fictional characters or 
sports teams. “Fantasists” was what she named the third category, with an interest 
in sex evident in the choice of passwords. The last group, with approximately 10 
percent of the respondents, she called “cryptics”; people who used passwords 
consisting of random strings of letters, symbols or numbers. 
 
1.5 Studies of Password Memorability 
Recalling passwords is not a simple case of having a go until you can 
remember it. Many systems only allow three attempts at entering a correct 
password and then restrict access. Most people then seek helpdesk assistance, or 
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click ‘forgot password’ and have their password reset electronically. This exercise 
can cause frustration for users, and can be a time consuming, and costly exercise 
for Information Technology (IT) departments.     
Dhamija and Perrig (2000, as cited in Brown, Bracken, Zoccoli & 
Douglas, 2004) found an accurate recall rate of 70 percent for passwords created a 
week previously by participants. They were passwords that had not been used 
before which they (the participants) considered to be secure.  
Leonhard (2006) tested the memorability of three types of random 
password generation algorithms. The first was an AlphaNum algorithm, which 
created a random password six characters long using upper and lower case letters 
and numbers, with a total of 62 possibilities per character. The second system was 
a Diceware Generator algorithm producing random lists of words, such as; ‘doze 
stuff salve’, ‘ample acidic leery’. The third was a Pronounce3 Generator which 
generated passwords that were pronounceable in English, using syllables based on 
their frequency in English writing, for example: abdaumso, cudawigo, urcezfae. 
Leonhard found little difference between the types of algorithms and only a total 
of four people out of 19 remembered their passwords after a two-week delay.  
The study by Brown, Bracken, Zoccoli, and Douglas (2004) also found 
that out of 218 students, 31 percent had forgotten passwords and 22 percent had 
experienced password mix-ups. The researchers found that the cognitive aspects 
of password creation, use, and recall had received little attention in the 
psychological literature. Yan, Blackwell, Anderson and Grant (2004) also 
highlighted the need for intervention at the password generation and renewal 
stage, when clear instructions about creating and memorizing a strong password 
should be given to users.  
Since there exists a tension between the need for security, with the need 
for usability and memorability, researchers have been testing various password 
systems to find a balance between them. Jeyaraman and Topkara (2005) looked at 
a way of generating mnemonic based passwords. Mnemonics are memory tools, 
and in this instance they refer to generating a password phrase or sentence to aid 
with password recall. The researchers proposed using the headlines from news 
stories to form passwords, as headlines tend to be simple, concise and memorable. 
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From the headlines, semantic variants of each word would then be created, for 
example, if the heading had the word ‘plane’, it could be changed to airplane, 
drone, glider, or helicopter, and the sentence would still make sense, but not 
exactly match the original. The sentences can then be encoded mnemonically by 
either using the first letter of each word, or the last letter of each word to form the 
password, or the nth letter of each word. Numbers could then be embedded into 
the password by, for example, changing ‘o’ to ‘0’. Upper-case letters could be 
incorporated by placing capitals where they would normally occur in natural 
language text, such as a capital for the beginning of the sentence or for names and 
places. At this stage, this method of password generation has not been tested, so it 
is not known how effective or usable it is in practice.  
 Another method that has been created but not yet tested is a system by 
Topkara, Atallah, and Topkara (2007), it takes the previous system one step 
further. A mnemonic password is generated by word substitutions of a news 
headline. It is then applied to a ‘helper card’, which is a grid with the website 
application written on the side, such as ‘Amazon’ and next to it is the beginnings 
of the password, for example, ‘T-%7’ the mnemonic is then used on the grid 
(which has the alphabet across the top) to complete the password. For example, 
‘b’ stands for ‘!’. The password generated is very strong, yet the method is fairly 
convoluted, and the ‘helper card’ must be kept in a secure, yet accessible place, 
and must be regenerated whenever passwords are renewed.  
 Lu and Twidale (2003) took a different approach to managing multiple 
passwords. Their system was based on the premise that if a few ‘hints’ were given 
about the password, it would jog users memory. The system was called Minimal 
Feedback Authentication (MiFA). Users could decide which parts of the password 
they would be happy to reveal, a snapshot image of the login and password would 
then be taken and the chosen characters semi-revealed and the rest represented as 
*. An example given by the researchers can be seen in Figure 1. The image could 
then be stored on a local machine, along with other passwords for other sites. 
However if they were logging on using a different machine, they would then have 
to recall the password without the help of the image. Results from a pilot study 
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(five participants) were fairly promising with 66 percent of passwords created 
using MiFA correctly recalled 10 days after they were created.   
 
Figure 1. A MiFA snapshot image of the login “MyName” and password 
“Password” (Source, Lu & Twidale, 2003). Note: image is deliberately degraded 
to thwart password-cracking software. 
 
 A comprehensive study carried out by Henry (2007) focused on password 
strength. The assumption was that passwords over 20 characters long would be 
very strong. His study used 139 participants, familiar with information 
technology, who were divided into four groups. The participants were allowed to 
choose one of five methods for creating their passwords. These were: The Old 
Address, which involves spelling out an old, but unforgettable address. 
Unexpected Nonsense, Ferguson and Schneirer (2003, as cited in Henry, 2007) 
recommended the use of unexpectedly nonsensical passphrases as passwords. 
Their example was, “Pink curtains meander across the ocean”. The Acrostic, 
which draws the first letter out of a phrase, instead of the complete word, as in the 
previous two methods. The Old Memory, (Burnett 2006, as cited in Henry, 2007) 
uses questions such as, “What was your favourite place to visit as a child?” The 
answer to the question was the password. The Confession, is a password that is a 
confession of something personal that the participant does, such as “I pick my 
nose and eat it”. The final choice available to participants was to use their own 
method of password creation.  
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 Once passwords had been created, participants were allowed to print out or 
write down the password, as a backup. They were then required to login and enter 
their password online once a week, for seven weeks. All participants in the four 
groups were allowed to choose which password system they used. Manipulated by 
the experimenter were the number of examples of password given (for the type of 
password method chosen), and the number of times participants were required to 
re-enter their passwords after generating them. The results showed that failure to 
recall passwords for the different types of passwords used ranged from 68 and 65 
percent, for the Address and Acrostic groups respectively to 31 percent recall 
failure for the Nonsense group.  With the number of attempts at password recall 
over the seven weeks ranging from 32 attempts for the Nonsense group to 109 
attempts for the confession group.   
 As stated by Henry (2007), the overall results showed that “30 percent of 
participants generated and used very strong passwords without failure for seven 
weeks”, (p.8). This appears to be a high proportion of failure, especially when 
participants had access to the correct password. The number of times that the 
password was re-entered at the generation stage, and the number of example 
passwords given had no effect on accurate recall. Henry surmises that the reasons 
for password failure are complex, and some users may require additional attention 
and resources to help resolve problems.  
 All told, there has not yet been a resolution between the need for security 
with the desire for memorability and usability regarding passwords. There is the 
practical issue of needing 100 percent memorability, an errorless performance, for 
the password system to work. This leads to the next section, the use of mnemonic 
aids for improving the creation, use and memorability of passwords. 
 
1.6    Mnemonic Aids for Passwords 
The use of mnemonic aids to assist with recall of information has been 
around for a long time. The Method of Loci (place) is possibly the oldest known 
mnemonic device, and was used by the Greeks in 500 B.C. It is the process of 
visualising a well-known room or place, and then placing items that need to be 
remembered within that room (Lea, 1975). Retrieval of the items can be carried 
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out by mentally walking through the room.  Miller, Galanter and Pribram (1960) 
described the Pegword method of associating rhyming words with numbers, for 
example: ‘1 is a bun’, ‘2 is a shoe’, ‘3 is tree’… items to be remembered could 
then be ‘hooked’ onto the rhyme. This method was particularly useful when trying 
to remember numbered or ordered information. Paivio (1965) proposed that 
concrete words could be visualized (and therefore recalled) better than abstract 
words, which cannot be visualized. His hypothesis was supported, imagery 
assisted with the ease and accuracy of recall. However, these mnemonic aids, 
particularly the first two, are not on the whole appropriate for passwords, there are 
other mnemonic aids that may help with encoding and retrieval of information, 
that may be more pertinent to passwords.  
One such aid recommended is the Meaningfulness Effect, demonstrated by 
Underwood (1964), whereby the number of letter pairs recalled by participants 
was superior when the letter pairs were meaningful. Another aid to retrieval is the 
level of processing carried out at the time of encoding. Craik and Lockhart (1972) 
proposed that incoming information could be processed at different levels, from 
shallow to deep and that the particular level of processing implemented affected 
the durability of memory, the processing was otherwise known as encoding. 
Structural encoding emphasized the physical structure of the stimulus and is fairly 
shallow processing. For example asking whether the word to be recalled is in 
upper or lower case is a form of shallow processing. Intermediate processing is 
phonemic encoding which looks at what a word sounds like. Semantic encoding 
addresses the actions and objects the word represents; it is a deep level of 
processing which produces more lasting memory. Yet Rogers, Kuiper and Kirker 
(1977) showed that information relating to ‘self’ – known as self-referent 
encoding – demonstrated even superior recall than semantic encoding. Anderson 
(1976) showed that elaboration had an effect on memory, that is, if the material to 
be encoded is elaborated on, and that elaboration is a product of the person’s real-
world experiences then encoding is enriched and recall improves. All four of these 
findings (meaningfulness effect, depth of processing, self-referent encoding, and 
elaboration) suggest that enriching the encoding process in various ways increases 
the memorability of stimuli in ways that could be useful in the context of 
password applications. 
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The Generation Effect (Slamecka & Graf, 1978) presented another aid to 
retrieval. The researchers found that recall performance was superior for words 
generated (chosen) by the participants, compared to words simply presented to 
participants to remember. Another aid is using a cue (which is a hint or starting 
point) at time of recall, as the use of a cue has been found to help with retrieval of 
originally encoded information (Beal, 1985).  If there is prior knowledge of the 
subject encoded then, information can be stored in chunks rather than individual 
items (Gobet, Lane, Croker, Cheng, Jones, Oliver, & Pine, 2001). Taken together 
with the previous methods of enriched encoding, self-generation, retrieval cues, 
and chunking provide additional mnemonic aids to improve memory recall. To 
gain a greater understanding of encoding and retrieval, looking at what hinders 
recall and common errors made at the retrieval stage may also help in the 
password selection process.  
Forgetting can be due to decay and interference. Decay theory proposes 
that the link – memory trace – between a cue and target memory decays over time, 
but rehearsal of the memory will refresh the trace (Thorndike, 1911). However, as 
McGeogh (1932, as cited in Nairne, 2002) stated, some memories fail to decline 
over time, and may even improve with time. He proposed that it is what occurs 
over the process of time such as, interference, that affects recall. Two types of 
interference that may occur are retroactive and proactive interference. Retroactive 
interference occurs when current learning interferes with earlier learning. While 
proactive interference occurs when old information interferes with new 
information. An example of this, regarding the present study, would be an old 
password interfering with the recall of a current password. There can be a release 
from proactive interference if the stimulus material is changed (Goggin & 
Wickens, 1971), such as changing the category of a password.  Confusion at the 
retrieval stage may also occur if there is more than one memory associated with a 
single retrieval cue, this is known as cue overload (Watkins & Watkins, 1975).  
Specifically looking at the memorability of passwords, Vu, Proctor, 
Bhargav-Spantzel, Tai, Cook, and Schultz (2007), analysed the types of recall 
errors that users made when using a sentence generation mnemonic technique for 
password creation. The most common error was a sentence error – participants 
forgot the sentence or the exact wording of the sentence. The second most 
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frequent error was special character/digit error, which occurred when the special 
character or digits used were forgotten. Thirdly association errors occurred when 
participants used the password from a different account. Next sentence and 
special character/digit errors occurred when participants forgot the sentence 
generated and/or the special character or digit. Finally, order errors occurred 
when the contents of the password were recalled but the sequence was forgotten. 
There may be other types of errors that occur for different password generation 
systems.  
 The sentence generation technique used by Vu et. al. (2007) had 
participants make up a sentence with at least six words, taking the first letter of 
each word to form the password, with some participants required to embed a 
special character and/or a number into the password. The passwords created were 
strong, but at the cost of memorability. This result was also found by Henry 
(2007) and reiterated by Sasse, Brostoff and Weirich (2001) who reported that 
“both security and usability experts have stated that recalling strong passwords is 
a humanly impossible task because strong passwords are non-meaningful items 
and hence inherently difficult to remember” (p. 126). In those instances, it may be 
so, however the sentence generation technique is only one mnemonic tool, which 
may involve self-generation, but does not include self-referent encoding, 
elaboration, chunking and the use of cues to improve recall performance. A 
method of password selection that incorporates a variety of mnemonic tools may 
be the solution to the ‘forgotten password’.  
 
1.7    The Present Study 
An overview of current literature regarding password selection, use and 
memorability shows that firstly, many people do not understand what a secure 
password is and why it is necessary to implement secure password practices. 
Secondly users have difficulty creating passwords that can be recalled at some 
later date, and therefore resort to writing passwords down or using the same 
password for multiple accounts. Research in this area has begun to look at ways of 
addressing these problems, namely applying mnemonics to the password process. 
However, mnemonic passwords have been investigated in only a few studies, and 
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performance was not as good as it needs to be for practical use, that is 100 percent 
accurate recall to allow access to required sites or information. Yet, encoding 
effects in memory literature suggest some additional procedures show promise for 
password applications. The purpose of the present study was to investigate 
whether a procedure to aid participants in generating meaningful, self-referential, 
and elaborated passwords, incorporating the use of a cue, would be of practical 
use.  
We anticipated that passwords produced by means of mnemonic process 
would have higher accurate recall rates than randomly generated passwords or 
passwords selected by participants without the mnemonic process. Secondly, we 
expected that passwords produced via the mnemonic process would be recalled 
with high levels of accuracy over distributed recall periods, more so than if the 
passwords were ‘self-selected’ by participants or if they were randomly assigned 
to participants. Thirdly, we predicted that passwords produced utilising mnemonic 
aids would be subject to less interference (namely proactive interference) when 
passwords are changed, as compared to the other two methods of password 
generation (self-selection and random).  Finally, we anticipated that passwords 
produced by the use of mnemonic processes would be more resistant to password 
attacks, that is, have a greater degree of entropy than self-selection and randomly 
assigned passwords.  
A further aim of this study was to ascertain password user habits and 
collect general demographic information about participants. In addition to testing 
the working memory capacity of participants by administering the WAIS-III, digit 
span sub-test, for the reason that working memory capacity may influence 
participant’s ability to receive, store and retrieve information.  
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2. Method 
 
2.1 Participants 
Thirty-three professionals from a number of organisations within the 
Waikato, the majority of whom were employed in the Engineering and 
Accountancy professions, participated in the study, along with 19 first year 
psychology students from Waikato University. A total of 52 participants were 
recruited, with one participant withdrawing after three weeks due to personal 
reasons. The mean age of the participants was 32.46 (SD = 11.77), and the range 
was from 17 to 61 years. The participants included 19 males and 33 females. 
Working memory scores for participants ranged from 3 – 14 (14 being the highest 
possible score).  
Participants from the workforce were recruited by approaching 
engineering and accountancy employers in the local area. These professions were 
chosen because of their frequent use of passwords. A brief description of the 
study and the requirements for participation were explained. Once consent was 
obtained from management, employees were then approached, and given written 
and verbal instructions on what the study entailed (see instruction sheet in 
Appendix A). If the employees were happy to proceed, they then completed an 
informed consent form (see Appendix B). Two prizes with a combined value of 
$300 were drawn by an independent party at the conclusion of the study and 
allocated to two of these participants.  
First year psychology students were recruited by placing a flyer on their 
online message board, a copy of the flyer can be seen in Appendix C. An 
appointment was made to meet with those showing interest in the study to further 
explain what participation entailed. Informed consent was obtained from those 
wishing to participate. Two course credits were assigned to students who 
participated in the study.  
Data collated from the background questionnaire revealed that participants 
had on average 6.3 applications that required passwords and of those applications, 
3.9 of the passwords were unique. That is, many reused the same password for 
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more than one application. There was no significant correlation found between the 
number of passwords participants had and correct recall of passwords; that is, 
there was no evidence that the more passwords a person had to remember, the 
more difficult it was to accurately recall the passwords.  
Seventy-nine percent of participants had forgotten a password, and had 
contacted a ‘help desk’ to have the password reset. The main type of passwords 
created by participants was a mixture of complete words (including names) and 
numbers. Eighty-eight percent of participants were asked (on average, at two 
sites) to renew their password at various intervals, mostly every 60 days. 
 
2.2 Materials 
 Three instruments were used as experimental materials:  
i. A background questionnaire 
ii. Working memory test (Backward Digit Span) 
iii. Retrospective post-study questionnaire 
The background questionnaire consisted of 10 questions asking about 
participant’s current password habits. Questions one to five asked; how many 
passwords were required of them, how many unique passwords did they have, 
how often were they asked to renew them, how often did they actually renew 
them, and did they write them down? Questions six and seven enquired about 
whether they had ever forgotten a password or contacted a ‘help desk’ to reset a 
password. Participants were then asked to indicate which type of password they 
most often used, out of a list of possible methods; for example, names, words and 
numbers. Demographic information, such as age and gender, was also requested 
(see Appendix D for background questionnaire). 
 The digit span, verbal subtest of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, 
version three (WAIS-III) was administered. A list of two to nine digits was read 
aloud, the participant repeated back the digits. This was then repeated, but the 
participant repeated the digits back in reverse order. Backward Digit Span (BDS), 
in particular was assessed as a measure of working memory capacity. A deficit in 
working memory function may contribute to an anomaly in the results.   
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The retrospective post-study questionnaire was sent to participants as a 
hyperlink with their final password recall request (3rd recall of 3rd password). The 
retrospective post-study questionnaire consisted of eight questions. The purpose 
of the questionnaire was to find out how easy or hard the passwords were to create 
and recall. The questionnaire asked what, if any, systems did the participant 
employ to remember the password, and did any of the previous passwords 
interfere with remembering the current password? The participants were also 
asked to recall, if possible, all three passwords used in the present study (see 
Appendix E for post-study questionnaire). 
 
2.3 Procedure 
The study was a mixed design with three levels of the between-group 
factor, password type, and three levels of the within-group factor, password 
renewal. Figure 2 shows a visual representation of the process involved. The 
independent variable of password type was manipulated by randomly and evenly 
assigning participants to one of three groups: 
i. Mnemonic, passwords, created according to proven cognitive principles 
for encoding, memory and recall. 
ii. Self-selected, passwords chosen by participants. 
iii. Random passwords created by the experimenter and assigned to 
participants.  
The second independent variable, password renewal, was manipulated by 
requiring each participant to recall three successive passwords. In addition, each 
password was tested for recall three times, a week apart. This provided a 
dependant variable, correct/incorrect. Participants were allowed up to three 
attempts at entering a correct password, which generated another dependant 
variable – number of attempts per trial.  
All three groups had the same criteria for creating passwords, as outlined 
in Table 2. The criteria were adopted from the standards set for passwords by 
most banks, and in this instance, the Westpac Bank. The self-selection group were 
asked to create a password based on the criteria in Table 2 (the instruction sheet 
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for the self-selected group can be seen in Appendix F). Participants in the random 
group were given a random password, generated by an online random password 
generator that met the password criteria. An example of a random password given 
to participants in the random group can be seen in Appendix G.  
The mnemonic group used a system of password creation based on proven 
cognitive principles for encoding, memory and recall. A summary of the 
mnemonic instruction sheet is shown in Table 3, and the complete form can be 
seen in Appendix H. 
 
 
Figure 2. The mixed experimental design used in the present study. 
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Table 2  
Criteria for all Passwords 
 
 
Table 3 
Mnemonic Group Instructions 
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Participants were seen individually either in an office at their workplace or 
at an office at the University. After consenting to participate, they completed the 
background questionnaire (see Appendix D). The digit span subtest of the WAIS-
III was then administered to assess working memory function.  
Participants were then randomly and evenly assigned to one of the three 
groups. The participants were then asked to create, or were assigned a password, 
based on the criteria set for each group. They were then directed to a computer 
where the password login webpage was displayed. They logged on using their 
email address, and then entered their password. An example of the login page can 
be seen in Figure 3. To thank them for their participation, a chocolate bar and 
drink was offered.  
A week following the initial assignment of passwords, participants were sent 
an email (see Figure 4), with a hyperlink connecting them to the login page 
(Figure 3). They entered their user name – which was the email address that the 
participant was using for the study – followed by their password. The password 
characters typed were suppressed and instead shown as black dots, this along with 
allowing three attempts at entering a correct password, was implemented to create 
a login system that matched real-world login sites. Participants in the mnemonic 
group were also given their password cue when emailed (see Table 3). This was 
known as the first recall of the first password R(1-1), as seen in Figure 2. 
Information entered on the login page was saved to a remote 
authentication server. The server recorded the attempts made, whether the 
password entered was correct or incorrect, and the number of attempts used. The 
login username and password had to be 100 percent accurate to receive a ‘correct 
– thank you for participating’. The passwords were also case sensitive.  
Two weeks after the initial password was created, participants were 
emailed again and asked to enter their password into the login page for the second 
time, R(1-2) – password one, second recall (see Figure 2). This was repeated again 
the following week (R(1-3)). At this stage, participants were seen again, and asked 
to create or be assigned a new password – using the same instructions that they 
were initially given – this was known as password renewal.  The second password 
was tested for recall a week later, R(2-1) and again, two and three weeks after 
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renewal (R(2-2) and R(2-3)). After the third recall of the second password, the 
password was renewed for the third and final time and then recall was tested for 
the following three weeks (R(3-1) to  R(3-3)).  Each time participants renewed their 
password, chocolates were offered as an appreciation of their involvement. A 
visual representation of the password process is shown in Figure 2. 
 Along with the final email for the 3rd recall of the 3rd password, an 
additional hyperlink was included. The hyperlink connected participants to the 
retrospective post-study questionnaire, which was completed online. Participants 
were also thanked for their involvement.  
 
Figure 3. Password login screens for participants. 
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Figure 4. Password reminder email sent to participants. 
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3. Results 
3.1 General 
 The following results are, for the most part, laid out in the order of the 
hypotheses made in the Introduction. The first section looks at accurate recall of 
passwords, comparing the results found for each group. In conjunction with 
accurate recall, the number of attempts made at each password trial is compared 
across groups. Also with respect to the accurate recall of passwords, the results 
from the retrospective post-study, asking participants to recall all three passwords, 
are portrayed. The second section considers and assesses the strength of the 
passwords that were created throughout the study. Finally, error analysis of 
incorrect password recall and the subjective findings for each group were looked 
into further. 
 
3.2.1 Group differences – Accurate recall of passwords. 
Figure 5 shows the mean percent correct recall for each group and the 95 
percent confidence intervals. A one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was 
conducted using the percentage total correct recall per participant for all trials 
completed, between the three groups. The difference between groups was 
significant, F(2,49) = 11.84, p < .001. Levene’s test for homogeneity of variances 
was significant (p < .05) showing that the sample variances for each group were 
not equal. This may have been due to the lack of variance within the mnemonic 
group. The percentage correct recall ranged from 62.5 – 100% in the mnemonic 
group, and the range was 0 – 100% in both the self-selection and random groups. 
The unusual variances across conditions could be attributed to the very high 
performance of the mnemonic group (SD = 13.20) relative to the self-selection 
(SD = 33.80) and random (SD = 33.78) groups. A Shapiro-Wilk test for normality 
showed that the distribution of the self-selection and random groups was within 
normal range. However, the distribution of the mnemonic group was not normal. 
Tukey’s HSD post hoc test showed that the mnemonic group had a significantly 
different percentage correct recall than the self-selection and random groups, (p < 
.001). The test also revealed two homogeneous subsets, the self-selection and the 
random groups in one set, and the mnemonic group in the other. 
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Since the homogeneity of variances and normality assumptions of 
ANOVA were not met, recall accuracy of the three groups were then analysed 
separately using a Kruskal-Wallis Test. Figure 6 provides a visual representation 
of the percentage correct recall for each password across the three conditions. The 
test showed that the differences in correct password recall between groups, for all 
three passwords, were significant, χ2 (2, n = 51) ≥ 6.50, p < .05.  
The results were further broken down to compare correct recall per group 
for each password trial (nine trials in total, three passwords tested three weeks 
each), shown visually in Figure 7. To compare the correct/incorrect results for 
each password recall trial between each group, a Pearson Chi-Square test was 
conducted. All recall points showed a significant difference between groups, χ2 (2, 
n=51) ≥ 7.95, p < .05, apart from recall R(2-1) and R(2-2), χ2, (2, n=49) ≥ 3.09, p > 
.05. The exceptions can be seen visually in figure 7.       
 
Figure 5. The mean percentage total correct recall across all trials. The shaded 
bars show the mean scores and the vertical bars represent the 95% confidence 
intervals.  
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Figure 6. Percentage correct recall per password for each group. 
 
Figure 7. Correct recall of passwords for each group, shown across each trial. 
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3.2.2 Password attempts. 
A further test of password accuracy was to calculate the number of 
attempts taken to gain a ‘correct’ trial or, on the other hand, how often all three 
attempts were used without achieving a correct answer. Figure 8 shows the 
average number of attempts used at each password recall trial, for each group. The 
mnemonic group had noticeably less attempts per trial than the self-selection and 
random groups. However, Figure 8 may be somewhat misleading as some 
participants mentioned that when they knew they were unable to remember their 
passwords they didn’t even attempt a guess. To gauge how often this may have 
occurred the number of trials missed by participants, were summed for each group 
and can be seen in Figure 9. (This in itself, however, may not be conclusive as 
some participants were away on holiday during the study and were unable to 
attempt some trials). Taken together, the findings from Figures 5 - 8 illustrate that 
accurate recall of all three passwords was superior for the mnemonic group in 
comparison to the self-selection and random groups.  
 
Figure 8. Average number of attempts made per password recall trial, with a 
maximum of three attempts allowed. 
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Figure 9, Total number of trials for which participants did not make any attempts 
at password recall.  
 
3.2.3 Analysis of individual differences. 
A Levene statistic for homogeneity of variances for both BDS and age of 
participants was not significant, so we can assume that the population variances 
for all groups are approximately equal. There was no correlation found between 
ages of participants and working memory score (BDS), r = .48, p > .05. There was 
also no significant difference in working memory scores, F(2,48) = .54, p > .05, or 
age of participants between the three groups, F(2,49) = .82, p > .05. No significant 
correlation was found between age of participants and the percentage correct total 
recall, (r = -.04, p > .05). In light of these findings, no analyses of covariance were 
conducted. However, there was a significant negative correlation between age of 
participants and the number of passwords that were required of them in every-
day-life (r = -.44, p < .01), indicating that younger people in the present sample 
reported needing a greater number of passwords than the older participants.  
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3.3 Retrospective Post-Study Password Recall 
At the completion of the study, participants were asked to complete an 
online questionnaire. As part of that post-study questionnaire, participants were 
asked to recall all three passwords (if possible). The overall response rate for 
completing the questionnaire was 76 percent of participants. Figure 10 shows the 
correct recall of all passwords after the conclusion of the study. A Chi-Squared 
test comparing the probability of correct recall of the three passwords across the 
three groups was conducted. The difference between groups for all three 
passwords was significant, χ2 (2, n=39) ≥ 6.81, p < .05. The graph revealed a 
recency effect for all three password groups, that is, the more recent the password 
was used/created the greater the accurate recall.  
 
Figure 10. Percentage correct recall of all three passwords, for each group, at the 
conclusion of the study. Average response rate, 76 percent. 
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3.4 Password Strength 
Password strength was calculated by measuring three items, character 
length, alphabet size, and entropy. Password strength was calculated for the 
mnemonic and self-selection groups only. Random passwords, allocated to the 
random group, should have a high degree of entropy, as they were randomly 
generated, thus security strength was analysed only for self-generated passwords. 
The minimum character length required per password was eight; therefore 
character length was scored as one point for eight characters and an additional 
point for each extra character. Alphabet size was scored as one point each for the 
following alphabet categories: password contained letters, password contained 
numbers, password included special characters, and password contained a 
combination of upper and lower case.  
Entropy is a measure of disorder or randomness and is scored subjectively. In the 
present experiment, three parties rated the entropy of the passwords using a scale 
of 0 – 5: Zero was given if the password did not meet the initial requirements set 
out on the instruction sheets (for example, some participants used complete words 
in their passwords), and 5 was allocated for a high degree of apparent 
randomness. The three raters’ scores were fairly similar, for the mnemonic group 
the mean ratings were (M = 3.29, SD = .91), (M = 4.33, SD = .86), (M = 4.43, SD 
= .63), and for the self-selection group the ratings from the three raters were (M = 
3.2, SD = 1.47), (M = 3.2, SD = 1.56), (M = 2.22, SD = 1.60). The following are 
examples of passwords that received a high score on entropy: 
• ss7ga830&dh 
• 1sf8g1n08 
• pcht05jc 
• 1ha9ma7sh8ti 
• wh&t4rs&fj 
Some examples of passwords that received a low score on entropy: 
• Bl8ue8bo8x 
• im21@1986 
• emosneve8 
• Princess2 
• draunbi08 
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The scores for all three measures (length, alphabet size, and entropy) were 
totalled to create an overall password strength score for each password created. 
The mean scores for each variable, for both groups, can be seen in Figure 11. The 
overall password strength for mnemonic and self-selection passwords generated in 
the study and the 95% confidence intervals can be found in Figure 12. The 
findings imply that participants in the mnemonic group were able to create 
passwords that were stronger (more secure) overall than the self-selection group.  
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 11. Mean score for password strength as a measure of character length, 
alphabet size and entropy. 
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Figure 12. Mean security strength of passwords for the mnemonic and self-
selection groups, a function of character length, alphabet size, and entropy. The 
vertical bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
3.5 Incorrect Recall - Error Analysis  
3.5.1 Mnemonic group  
 Looking back at the percentage correct recall of passwords in Figure 7 we 
can see a decrease in correct recall for the mnemonic group from password 1 to 
password 2. Which later corrected itself in password 3. A repeated measures t-test 
was carried out to ascertain whether the decrease in correct recall was significant. 
The change was not significant, t(16) = .89, p > .05 between password 1 and 
password 2, and not significant between password 2 and password 3, t(16)= -1.51, 
p > .05.  The difference in recall of password 1 and password 3 was also 
examined and found to be not significant, t(16) = -.62, p > .05 
 Although the statistical data show that the decrease in password recall 
between password 1 and 2 was not significant, statistical difference is not always 
practical difference. For the purpose of this study, reasons for the decrease in 
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accurate password recall for the mnemonic group were examined further to 
provide insight into why the errors occurred, and if possible, how they may be 
corrected. Five participants within the mnemonic group incorrectly recalled a 
password. Figure 13 portrays a summary of the error analysis.  
 
 
Figure 13. Number of participants in mnemonic group that incorrectly recalled a 
password, and the type of error made.  
 
 A lapse occurred when the participant was unable to correctly recall the 
password at the current recall attempt, yet they were able to later correctly recall 
the password at a following trial. One participant experienced an intrusion (an 
intrusion is usually an answer that would be correct in another context, Deese, 
1959) in their password when they added another variable to their item list. That 
is, the participant chose ‘friends’ as their category heading, then listed three 
friends (first names) and their respective ages. At recall time they correctly listed 
the friends and their ages in order, but also added the initial from the friend’s 
surnames. English was not the first language of the participant. It is not known if 
this may have contributed to the error. Finally, an ordering error occurred when 
the participant correctly recalled the password but entered the items in the 
incorrect order.  For one participant, the ordering error may have been due to the 
password category chosen being the same as the previous password. All, save one, 
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of the participants who incorrectly recalled a password, failed to follow the steps 
laid out in the instruction sheet. However, they acknowledged this at the 
following password renewal meeting and completed all steps when creating 
password 3. The results show how performance improved again when participants 
in the mnemonic group selected their third password (see Figure 6).  
 
3.5.2 Self-selection group 
Failure to accurately recall passwords, for participants in the self-selection 
group, appeared to be due to many and various reasons, and some types of errors 
occurred simultaneously. Still, there were some consistent mistakes carried out, 
they included: mixing upper and lower case, using the wrong number, ordering 
problems, missing out items, and intrusions. Figure 14 represents the percentage 
and types of errors made by the self-selection group. In all, 12 participants in the 
self-selection group incorrectly recalled a password, with six of those participants 
incorrectly recalling more than one password.   
  
 
Figure 14. Types and percentages of password recall errors made by participants 
in the self-selection group. 
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3.5.3 Random group 
Incorrect password recall also occurred within the random group for many 
and varied reasons, and it was at times difficult to determine the type of error that 
was occurring. However, there were some consistent mistakes carried out, they 
included: ordering difficulties, intrusions, only remembering the salient 
information, wrong or missing numbers, wrong letters, and getting the password 
entirely wrong. Figure 15 shows visually the types and percentages of recall errors 
made by participants in the random group. In total, 15 participants in the random 
group incorrectly recalled a password, with 10 of those participants incorrectly 
recalling more than one password.  
 
 
Figure 15. Types and percentages of password recall errors made by participants 
in the random group. 
 
 
3.6 Subjective Findings 
3.6.1 Mnemonic group  
Seventy-five percent of participants in the mnemonic group who 
completed the post study questionnaire (response rate was 71%) volunteered that 
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the password cue helped with password recall. As seen in Figure 16, all 
participants in the mnemonic group found their passwords ‘easy’ to remember. 
Table 4 shows some of the comments made by participants in the retrospective 
post-study questionnaire, regarding the study.  
Out of the participants who completed the online post-study questionnaire, 
three of them said, ‘yes’ earlier passwords did interfere with remembering the 
new password. Yet, two of those participants had 100 percent accurate recall over 
all trials, including the retrospective post-study password recall. The remaining 
participant was correct on all passwords trials (including post-study), except for 
one password.   
 
 
Figure 16. Percentage of participants in each group, who completed the 
retrospective post-study questionnaire, who perceived their passwords as ‘easy’ or 
‘hard’ to remember. 
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Table 4 
Some comments from participants in the mnemonic group, about the study, 
recorded in the retrospective post-study questionnaire 
  
 
3.6.2 Self-selection group 
 Participants in the self-selection group were not given any direction when 
creating their passwords, just the criteria for what the password must or must not 
include. Yet many people applied their own personal system of password creation. 
We asked participants about the method that they used in the post-study 
questionnaire. A summary of the systems used is shown in Figure 17. The 
response rate for the post-study questionnaire for participants in the self-selection 
group was 82 percent. 
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Figure 17. Password systems used/created by participants in the self-selection 
group, to assist with password recall. 
 
 Self-referent encoding applied to participants who used something familiar 
to them to create their passwords. Many used a rhyme, saying or song to go with 
the password. One participant mixed the names of two people and added a 
birthday to the end, using both self-referent encoding as well as organisation. 
Another participant used complete words backwards with numbers in-between 
(they found the word easy to recall but had trouble remembering which numbers 
they had used).  A number of participants in the self-selection group used one or 
more of the memory tools applied in the mnemonic group, but did not utilise all 
the rules together. Table 5 shows some of the comments made by self-selection 
participants in the retrospective post-study questionnaire, regarding the study. For 
the question “Did any of your earlier passwords interfere with remembering your 
new password?” only one participant in the retrospective post-study 
questionnaire, for the self-selection group, answered ‘yes’.  
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Table 5.  
Some comments from participants in the self-selection group, about the study, 
recorded in the retrospective post-study questionnaire 
 
 
 
3.6.3 Random group 
 Participants in the random group were also asked if they applied some 
system to remembering their passwords. Figure 18 portrays the types of methods 
used by the participants. The response rate for the post-study questionnaire for 
participants in the random group was 76 percent. 
Many in the random group used a method of associating the password 
with either real words, something familiar to them, or making up a sentence to fit 
the allocated password. Some broke the password into chunks to aid recall. Other 
participants used maintenance rehearsal, which is a form of rote repetition of the 
password until they thought they were able to remember it. Table 6 shows some 
of the comments participants in the random group made in the retrospective post-
study questionnaire, regarding the study. Four participants in the random group 
(who participated in the post-study questionnaire) said, ‘yes’ they felt that old 
passwords did interfere with remembering the current password.  
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Figure 18. Types of password systems used by participants in the random group, 
to assist with password recall. 
 
 
Table 6. 
Some comments from participants in the random group, about the study, recorded 
in the retrospective post-study questionnaire 
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3.7 General Findings 
Figure 19 depicts the type of password usually created by participants. As 
can be seen, a mixture of complete words and numbers is the most common type 
of password used. Passwords in the ‘other’ column include passwords assigned on 
entry to a system, nonsense words, a poem, or all numbers. 
 
 
Figure 19. Type of password most commonly created by participants. Based on 
information provided in the background questionnaire. 
 
 Eighty-eight percent of participants were asked (on average, at two sites) 
to renew their password as various intervals, mostly every 60 days. An interesting 
occurrence, although maybe not surprising, was that many participants 
(sometimes across trials) were unable to enter the correct user name, even though 
the user name was clearly shown in the recall email sent out weekly (seen in 
Figure 4), alongside the link to the login page. Some participants used their 
personal or work email user names, their names on their own, or an incorrect 
version of their user name. 
 
3.8 Summary of the Results 
 The results obtained across the study showed that the mnemonic group 
was significantly different from the self-selection and random groups. Accurate 
recall for the mnemonic group was superior in terms of: significantly more 
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accurate recall across all three passwords, visibly less attempts at entering a 
correct password, at each recall trial, and superior recall of all three passwords at 
the conclusion of the study.  
 With regard to password strength and security, both self-selection and 
mnemonic passwords were tested on the basis of password character length, 
alphabet size, and entropy. The findings indicated that participants in the 
mnemonic group created passwords that were stronger overall than passwords 
created by the self-selection group.  
 Error analyses for all three groups revealed a similar pattern of mistakes, 
with ordering errors, intrusions, missing numbers and letters, and mixing-up upper 
and lower case. However, participants in the mnemonic group were able to self-
correct their mistakes by going back to following the instructions provided. The 
subjective findings from the retrospective post-study questionnaire revealed the 
systems used by participants in the self-selection and random groups to aid with 
password recall. They included self-referent encoding, the use of rhymes and 
organisation for the self-selection group, and the use of associations, chunking, 
and maintenance rehearsal for the random group.   
 The post-study questionnaire also showed that all participants in the 
mnemonic group found their passwords easy to remember, while two thirds of 
participants in the self-selection group found their passwords easy to remember 
and less than a third of participants in the random group found their passwords 
easy to remember. This information was complemented by the comments made 
about the study by participants in each group. 
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4. Discussion 
 
 The system of password generation, incorporating a variety of mnemonic 
aids, presented in this study was found to be useable, secure and memorable. This 
was revealed in a number of ways. Firstly, participants in the mnemonic group 
were able to accurately recall all three passwords, across the three trials for each 
password, significantly more than participants in the self-selection and random 
groups recalled their passwords. The ability to remember the passwords, was not 
only more accurate at each trial, but long-term memory of the passwords 
remained stronger for the mnemonic group, this was revealed in the retrospective 
post-study questionnaire where recall of all three passwords was performed. 
These results are in direct contrast to those found by other studies carried out in 
this area. In particular, Henry (2007) who tested a variety of password generation 
systems, mainly passphrase based, across a similar timeframe, found an overall 
recall rate of 30 percent. Lu and Twidale (2003) also tested a system that provided 
password and login cues, however the recall rate was similar to the self-selection 
group in this experiment, sitting at around 65 percent accurate password recall.  
 The number of attempts used at each password trial also indicated how 
memorable the passwords generated by the mnemonic group were, and may also 
be an indication of participant motivation. Given that, if the participant was 
unable to recall their password, they were less likely to attempt to recall the 
password at a later stage or give up after one or two attempts. Vu et. al. (2007) has 
suggested that the ‘three times and you’re out’ rule for password entry is too 
severe. They propose that if the number of attempts allowed was increased, 
accurate recall may increase. Yet, the mnemonic group in this study, on the 
whole, only needed one attempt to gain a ‘correct – thank you for participating’, 
which confirms that the passwords created by them were memorable.  
 Passwords created by the mnemonic group were more secure than 
passwords created by the self-selection group, as the passwords generated had a 
greater number of characters in them, slightly higher alphabet size, and a higher 
degree of entropy. If we assess the passwords produced on the basis of password 
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strength described in the introduction (section 1.2) they may be somewhat 
deficient in the area of alphabet size. All the passwords created by the mnemonic 
group included letters and numbers, however only some included special 
characters, and a few utilised upper and lower case. One way to improve alphabet 
size, would be educating users on what a strong password consists of, providing 
information on the effect of character length, alphabet size and entropy, on 
password security. Participants in this study were not provided with any 
information on password strength.  However, the character length and degree of 
entropy of the passwords generated by the mnemonic group suggests that they are 
relatively safe from guessing attacks.  
 Assessing whether the mnemonic system applied in this study was usable 
requires a more indirect approach. Usability can be revealed in the performance of 
a system, yet it is also a perception of the user. From information collated in the 
post-study questionnaire, we can see that all participants in the mnemonic group 
(who completed the questionnaire) found their passwords ‘easy’ to recall. This 
was supported by the comments made by participants in the group. For example, 
“…how easy it is to make a complicated password easy to remember”, “The 
password seemed logical…”, “Applying rational, logical order worked for me…”, 
“I couldn’t believe how easy it was to remember”. Another sign of usability is the 
number of trials missed or not attempted, as noted previously, this may be an 
indicator of participant motivation. Weirich and Sasse (2002) put forward that 
“password mechanisms and their users form a socio-technical system, whose 
effectiveness relies strongly on users’ willingness” to engage in the process (p. 
137). The results showed that the mnemonic group had six trials which were not 
attempted, compared to twice that many for the self-selection group, and 14 trials 
missed by participants in the random group. Overall, the mnemonic system used 
here appears to be usable. 
 The occurrence of password renewal had an interesting effect on recall 
results. In Figure 6 we see that changing passwords had little effect on the 
performance of the random group, accurate recall remained just below 50 percent 
for all three passwords. For the self-selection group accurate recall dropped when 
the password was initially changed, and then dropped slightly again when the 
password was renewed for the third time. Password recall for the mnemonic group 
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looked extremely positive for the initial password, only one participant failed to 
recall their password, and this was due to interference. Yet when the first 
password change occurred at week four, three participants were unable to recall 
their passwords. The errors appeared to be due to ordering problems (two 
participants) and a lapse for one participant. All three of these participants took a 
shortcut during the generation process. Weirich and Sasse (2002) reiterate that 
most users will cut corners to reduce task load. This indicates that the cognitive 
encoding processes involved in the generation stage do have an effect on recall. 
This is looked into further later in the discussion. For the third and final password 
change, recall for the mnemonic group rose back up to nearly 100 percent 
accuracy, just one participant incorrectly recalled their password in the second 
trial R(3-2) and later self-corrected it in the third trial R(3-3). The low failure rate for 
the mnemonic group is exceptional when compared to other studies. Lu and 
Twidale (2003), using a Minimal Feedback Authentication (MiFA) system, that 
revealed parts of the login and password to participants, had 66 percent password 
recall, with a small sample, after one week delay. Henry (2007) tested 139 
participants, who were technically adept, weekly, over seven weeks (which is 
more inline with this study), and found that only 30 percent of participants were 
able to correctly recall their passwords over the course of the study.  Therefore we 
can confirm that incorrect password recall, when changing a password, was lower 
for the mnemonic group than the self-selection and random groups. We may also 
presuppose that incorrect password recall at renewal time is lower using this 
method than other methods available at this time.  
 Assessing whether, and to what degree, proactive interference occurred is 
more difficult. Participants were asked whether they felt the older passwords 
interfered with the password currently being recalled. The highest response came 
from the random group, with four participants stating ‘yes’, closely followed by 
the mnemonic group with three participants agreeing, interestingly enough only 
one participant in the self-selection group felt that old passwords had interfered 
with the current one. Of the three participants in the mnemonic group, who felt 
that proactive interference had occurred, two had 100 percent correct recall across 
all trials, including the post-study recall. The other participant only missed one 
password, out of all the trials. So, it appears that it was a perception of proactive 
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interference, rather than interference actually occurring. Conversely, you could 
presume that the self-selection group would encounter proactive interference, with 
the medium to high rate of incorrect recalls that occurred, and yet they didn’t 
perceive that it had taken place.  
Proactive interference could have contributed to the incorrect password 
recall for one participant in the mnemonic group who incorrectly recalled the 
second password (they were one of two participants who had ordering problems). 
The category that they chose was the same category as the first password, and the 
cue used was identical. However, it was only after trying various combinations of 
the correct password that they resorted to adding items from the first password. 
On the third password they chose a category that was entirely different from the 
first two. This, as reported previously, creates a release from proactive 
interference (if it actually occurred in the first case). Conversely recall errors 
could be attributed to cue overload – having more than one memory/password 
associated with a single cue (Watkins & Watkins, 1975). In sum, it is not 
conclusive that the amount of proactive interference was less for the mnemonic 
group compared to the self-selection and random groups. Yet, we can see that 
interference, decay and errors were significantly less for the mnemonic group 
compared to the other two groups.   
Heading back to the topic of the effectiveness of encoding processes 
involved in the generation of mnemonic passwords used in the study, Figure 20 
depicts a password created by one of the participants in the mnemonic group, 
indicating the mnemonic aids utilized throughout the process.  
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Figure 20. An example of a password created by a participant in the mnemonic 
group. The callouts indicate the mnemonic aids utilized and the order they 
occurred in the generation process.   
 
 The mnemonic aids used can be seen in the example, starting with the 
participant generating their own category heading of something that interests them 
or they have knowledge of (self-referent). Followed by elaborating on the theme 
and listing three or four items associated with the category. The first letters, any 
numbers or special characters were then underlined – this is similar to the 
sentence generation/pass phase methods used by other researchers. The characters 
underlined were then taken to the side and chunked into a single unit for each line. 
The complete password was then written below, while the participant repeated to 
himself or herself what each character stood for. Finally, the cue was recorded and 
later used as a reminder/prompt when the login email was sent to participants in 
the mnemonic group (see Figure 4).   
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 In order to understand whether all or only some of the mnemonic aids 
were necessary, we can look back at the errors that occurred as well as the 
comments made by participants in the post-study questionnaire. Regarding the 
password cue, three quarters of participants in the mnemonic group of their own 
accord, said that the cue helped with remembering their password, as seen from 
the following comments by participants: “The cue triggered the sequence I needed 
to remember…”, “…even if I was struggling to remember at times the key word 
always triggered the memory”. The cue appeared to have worked like a door 
handle, once turned it opened the door to the complete password. Participants in 
the mnemonic group also reported that because the items were self-referent it 
helped them to remember them, or to put it in their own words, “They related to 
something I knew…”, The password was always related to a topic I was familiar 
with…”, “because it was related to something I knew well, it was easy to 
remember because it wasn’t a random assortment of some numbers and letters it 
had some meaning”. This information suggests that passwords that are self-
generated, using material that is personally meaningful, facilitates recall. 
Chunking the first letter of the items listed meant that only three units needed to 
be remembered rather than eleven characters, this would reduce task workload, 
and therefore assist with recall. From the error analysis, we saw that participants 
who failed to follow the steps shown in Figure 20 had difficulties with password 
retrieval. Therefore we could assume that the process of writing down the 
category items, then listing the chunks, followed by writing the complete 
password down, does have an effect on the ability to accurately recall the 
password. So, it appears that all the mnemonic aids used in the present study do 
have a function and role in the accurate recall of passwords.  
 The practical implications of this study are promising. The mnemonic 
system demonstrated here could be applied to many password applications, 
particularly where information security is paramount. However, education about 
the types of attack passwords are vulnerable to and the characteristics of a secure 
password should be taught in conjunction with the system, to provide an 
understanding of why secure password systems are necessary and to increase user 
compliance. A limitation of the present study, though, is that it only tested a single 
password at a time, it would be of interest to see the effects of testing multiple 
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passwords concurrently using the same mnemonic system. For example, 
participants could begin by generating a single mnemonic password, tested across 
a period of weeks then additional passwords could be added at certain points, 
while retaining the previous passwords. Of interest, would be the effect of 
categories used, that is; do the category headings used as a basis for the password 
items need to be mutually exclusive? And at what point do passwords begin to 
interfere with one another? An unexpected finding, in the present study, was that 
many participants were unable to correctly enter their user name on the login 
page, even though it was clearly stated on the reminder email (seen in Figure 4).  
 A suggestion to cope with these potential difficulties – that is using 
multiple accounts with multiple passwords and usernames – would be creating a 
password organiser that looks like the chart in Figure 21. As can be seen, a single 
password was applied to multiple sites, this could be acceptable if the password 
chosen was strong, and the important sites had their own unique password.   
 
Figure 21. Password organiser, showing the application site, username and 
password cue (note some passwords are used at multiple sites). 
 
 In conclusion, the present study showed that there is hope yet for 
passwords. Using mnemonic processes enabled participants in this sample to 
accurately recall their passwords nearly 100 percent of the time. This is a dramatic 
  50 
increase compared to results from previous research in this area. Ultimately, the 
system presented here needs to be tested in the market place, and applied to 
multiple applications, with multiple passwords at the same time, in conjunction 
with user education, in order to see how it stands up in the ‘real world’.  
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Appendix A 
Welcome to the Internet Password Study 
 
 
Instructions The  purpose  of  the  study  is  to  find  out  more  about  the  practices  of individual’s with regard to Internet passwords, and to look at the generation and memorability of different types of Internet passwords. We are asking participants in the study to: 1. Answer a questionnaire about their Internet password habits. 2. Complete a brief working memory test. 3. Generate or be assigned a password. You will be asked to enter your email address on a computer screen and enter the created password into the space provided (like a login page).  4. A week after the initial meeting you will be sent an email with a link to a webpage where you will be asked to enter your email address and password  into  the  space  provided.  You  will  be  given  three  tries  at entering  a  correct  password.  You will  be  sent  emails  two  and  three weeks after  the  initial password was assigned or created, requesting you enter your password.  5. Three weeks after the initial meeting we will meet with you again to renew your password in the same way that the  initial password was chosen. For the following three weeks you will be sent an email each week asking you to enter your renewed password. 6. We will then meet with you, for your password to be renewed for the third  and  final  time.  For  three weeks  after  that  you will  be  sent  an email each week requesting your email address and password.  7. At  the  end of  the  study  you will  be  emailed  a  brief  questionnaire  to complete online.   All information will be treated in the strictest confidence and if you have any questions feel free to ask us. You can withdraw from the experiment at any time. We would like to begin by having you complete an informed consent sheet and then answer some background questions about your internet password habits. Thank you in advance for your participation. Tracy Filmer‐Clark  filmer@wave.co.nz 
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Appendix B 
 
 
  University of Waikato Psychology Department 
Consent Form   RESEARCHER’S COPY   Research Project:  Internet Passwords Name  of  Researcher:  Tracy  Filmer‐Clark        Name  of  Supervisor:    Dr.  S.G. Charlton I  have  received  an  information  sheet  about  this  research  project  or  the researcher has explained the study to me.  I have had the chance to ask any questions  and  discuss  my  participation  with  other  people.  Any  questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I  agree  to  participate  in  this  research  project  and  I  understand  that  I may withdraw at any time. If I have any concerns about this project, I may contact the convenor of the Research and Ethics Committee (Dr Robert Isler, phone: (07) 838 4466 ext. 8401, email: r.isler@waikato.ac.nz). Participant’s Name: _______________ Signature: _________________ Date:______________             
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 University of Waikato Psychology Department 
Consent Form   PARTICIPANTS COPY   Research Project:  Internet Passwords Name  of  Researcher:  Tracy  Filmer‐Clark        Name  of  Supervisor:    Dr.  S.G. Charlton I  have  received  an  information  sheet  about  this  research  project  or  the researcher has explained the study to me.  I have had the chance to ask any questions  and  discuss  my  participation  with  other  people.  Any  questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I  agree  to  participate  in  this  research  project  and  I  understand  that  I may withdraw at any time. If I have any concerns about this project, I may contact the convenor of the Research and Ethics Committee (Dr Robert Isler, phone: (07) 838 4466 ext. 8401, email: r.isler@waikato.ac.nz). Participant’s Name: _______________ Signature: _________________ Date:______________ 
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Appendix C 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We are asking participants in this study to: 
→ Answer a questionnaire about your password habits. 
→ Complete a brief working memory test. 
→ Generate or be assigned a password, and enter into login page (like 
above). 
→ A week later you will be sent an email and link asking you to login with 
your new password. This will be repeated two and three weeks later. 
→ Then we will meet with you again to renew your password, and for the 
following  three weeks you will be  sent an email  and  link asking you  to 
login with your new password. 
→ We will  then meet with you,  for your password  to be  renewed  for  the 
third and final time. For three weeks after that you will be sent an email 
each week requesting you login with your latest password. 
→ At  the  end  of  the  study  you  will  be  emailed  a  brief  questionnaire  to 
complete online. 
 
PSYC103 students will receive 2 course credits for taking part. 
(as well as refreshments) 
 
If interested, please txt me on 
021 653 142 
or email 
filmer@wave.co.nz 
Thanks, Tracy Filmer‐Clark  
   
User Name  
   
Password 
Login 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Appendix D 
 
Background Questionnaire ­ Internet Password Habits (all information provided will be kept in strict confidence)  1. Please tick the box for websites you use that require a password. 
2. How many different passwords do you use for these sites? __________    3. Do you write your passwords down?    YES     NO   (circle one)   4. How many sites ask you to renew your password?   _____________  5. How often do you renew your passwords?   (circle one) Weekly  Monthly  Every 60 Days  Yearly   Never 6. Have you ever forgotten a password?        YES  NO  (circle one) 7. Have you ever contacted a ‘help desk’ to retrieve or reset a forgotten password?  YES  NO  (circle one) 8. Please indicate what sort of password you usually choose: 
□ Names (proper & nicknames) 
□ Words & Numbers 
□ Important dates 
□ Complete words 
□ Mixture of random numbers and letters 
□ Other, please specify ___________________________________    9. Are you?      Male           Female    (please circle)    10. How old are you? __________ 
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Appendix E 
Retrospective Post Study Questionnaire   (all information provided will be kept in strict confidence) Please circle which best applies to you, or write in the space provided 1. Did you later write any of your passwords down?  Yes  No  (circle one)  2. Have you used your passwords anywhere else?   Yes   No  (circle one)    3. How did you remember your passwords?   4. Were your passwords easy or hard to remember? Hard  Easy (circle one) 5. Why do you think so?    6. Did any of your earlier passwords interfere with remembering your new password?    Yes  No  (circle one)  7. Other comments you wish to make regarding the research   8. If possible, please recall your passwords in the space provided Password 1. _________________ Password 2. _________________ Password 3. _________________  Thank  you  for  participating  in  this  study  of  password  generation  and memorability.  If  you  wish  to  receive  a  summary  of  the  results,  please provide us with your email address: ______________________  
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Appendix F 
Internet Password Study 
Participant Instructions  
Self­Selection Group You need to select a password. The password you choose must be between 8 –  12  characters  long  and  include  at  least  1  letter  and  1  number  and  may include special characters. Do not use a password that you use elsewhere and that you have used in the past.  Do not choose a password that can be easily guessed or that relates to known personal  information  about  yourself  and  your  family  such  as  birthdays, names,  or  telephone numbers. Also do not use  sequential  numbers  such as 4321 or repetitive numbers such as 4444. Do not use complete words.   Enter  your  email  address  on  the  screen,  where  requested.  Once  you  have thought of your password enter the password into the space provided.   
Do not share your password with anyone else. 
Do not write down or record your password   Thank you for your time and your participation. 
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Appendix G 
Internet Password Study 
Participant Instructions   
 
Random Group  Below is a random password between 8 – 12 characters long. Take a few minutes  to  memorise  it  then  enter  your  email  address  on  the  screen, where requested and enter the password into the space provided.        
Do not share your password with anyone else. 
Do not write down or record your password.     Thank you for your time and your participation. 
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Appendix H 
Internet Password Study 
Participant Instructions 
 
Mnemonic Group You need to select a password. The password you choose must be between 8 ‐  12  characters  long  and  include  at  least  1  letter  and  1  number  and  may include special characters.  Do not use a password that you use elsewhere or that you have used in the past. Do not choose a password that can be easily guessed or that relates to known personal  information  about  yourself  and  your  family  such  as  birthdays, names,  words  or  telephone  numbers.  Also  do  not  use  sequential  numbers such as 4321 or repetitive numbers such as 4444.  
Follow these steps in choosing your password: 1. Think of  a  category of  something  that  interests you,  for example, cars, a specific sport, a type of animal, colours, flowers, music etc. 2. Within this category think of  three or  four different  items that  fit into  it.  They  can  be  more  than  one  word  and  can  also  have  a number in them. 3. List  the  items.  If  they  do  not  include  any  numbers  then  add  a number to the front or back of the item. Some examples are:  Cars            Music Bands BMW Z3 (Roadster)        1. Foo Fighters BMW 5 Series        2. Artic Monkeys & BMW 7 Series        3. Led Zeppelin! Audi A8              
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Fishing (I caught…….)      Spring Flowers (I planted…) 2 Kahawai          30 Daffodils 4 Snapper          20 Tulips 6 Tuna           15 Iris 8 Striped Marlin        5 Freesias  4. Write the list again, this time thinking of and picturing the item as you  write  it.  Then  underline  the  first  letter  of  every  word  and every number. 5. Say each  line  to yourself  and  then  say  the underlined  letters and numbers continue with the next line, until finished. For example:  BMW Z3 (Roadster)  Z 3      1 Foo Fighters   1 FF 
BMW 5 Series  B 5     OR    2 Artic Monkeys &  2AM& 
BMW 7 Series  B 7      3 Led Zeppelin!  3 LZ ! Audi A8    A 8         
=  z3b5b7a8          =  1ff2am&3lz!  
Cue: Cars          Cue: Bands     6. Then  write  out  the  underlined  letters  and  numbers  and  say  to yourself, without looking at the full description. These letters and numbers are the password. Repeat  these steps,  if necessary, until the password has been learnt and can be repeated without looking at the paper. 7. On a separate piece of paper write the category heading, e.g. Cars to use later as a password cue. 8. Enter  your  email  address  on  the  screen,  where  requested.  Enter the password you have created into the space provided.  9. Please hand in all paper you have used in the experiment. We will keep a record of your category heading for next time.   
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Further Examples  Television (My favourite programs are…….) Dancing with the stars 1  DWTS 1 &        & American Idol 2    AI 2 
= dwts1&ai2   cue: TV  Rugby  Dan Carter 12  DC 12 Jo Rokocoko 14  JR 14 Richie McCaw 7  RM 7 
= dc12jr14rm7    cue: Rugby    
Do not share your password with anyone else. 
Do not write down or record your password.  Thank you for your time and your participation. 
 
